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A HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO TRANS-
BORDER DATA EXCHANGES BETWEEN
EU MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED
STATES UNDER THE EUROPEAN UNION
DIRECTIVE ON THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION
By Patricia Mell*
"Information is the lifeblood that sustains political, social, and
business decisions."'
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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's world, the borders of the individual's native land
no longer limits the individual's experiences or acts as a barrier
to the dissemination of personal information. Multinational
companies exchange personnel information across national bor-
ders to its subsidiaries.2 Data marketing concerns seek infor-
mation about potential customers for a myriad of businesses
around the world.3 Credit card systems are international in
scope and maintain records concerning millions of credit card
holders. 4 Governments have come to rely upon shared informa-
tion as a basis of efficient decision making.5 The international
exchange of information concerning criminal activity facilitates
safety and security worldwide. 6
2 See ERNST LouwERs AND CORIEN E.J. PRINS, ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL COM-
PUTER LAW 17-15 (1995). Some personnel data bases hold 140 different pieces of
information on each employee. See Donald Harris, A Matter of Privacy: Managing
Personal Data in Company Computers, PERSONNEL, Feb. 1987, at 38.
3 In 1990, the data marketing industry was estimated to generate 3 billion
dollars a year. See Jill Smolowe, Read This!!!!!!!, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 62, 66. It
was also reported that there were 10,000 data marketing lists commercially avail-
able. See id.
4 In the first ten years of its existence, Visa (then known as BankAmericard)
grew from having 1 million cardholders worldwide to 30 million card holders. See
JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 230 (1974). In 1971,
American Express had 3.5 million members. See id. By 1990, its membership had
grown to include a worldwide membership of 30 million. See JOHN M. CARROLL,
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SOURCES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 198 (1991).
5 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA-
TION SOCIETY 4 (1977). In 1976, the federal government held 3.9 billion files on
private citizens. See 45 U.S.L.W. 2161 (Sept. 28, 1976). In 1989, the federal govern-
ment held an average of 18 files on each individual while state government held an
average of 15 files on each resident. See ROBERT E. SMITH, PRIVACY: HOW TO PRO-
TECT WHAT'S LEFT OF IT 82 (1980). See also CARROLL, THE PROBLEM OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL DATA FLOWS IN POLICY ISSUES IN DATA PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 201
(Informatics Studies No. 10, 1976).
6 The best known internal criminal information repository is the Interna-
tional Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). See CARROLL, supra note 4, at 99-
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The merging of computer technology and telecommunica-
tions systems allowed the world community to capitalize on in-
formation's value as a core resource. 7 This merger has
facilitated the replacement of the industrial economy with one
based on the exchange and manipulation of information.8 The
demand for better and more complete information by multina-
tional concerns and their cooperation with one another has led
to an "internationalization" of data exchanges.9 At the core of
these transactions is the collection, storage, manipulation and
dissemination of personal information about individuals. 10
Much of this personal information flows between bureaucracies
without the individual's awareness. This phenomenon was de-
scribed as follows.
The private and public bureaucracies are the repositories of the
planning power in the economy.... The two bureaucracies coordi-
nate with each other through a blizzard of forms and reports, and
through the revolving door between industry and government.
Expertise is exchanged through the purchase of R & D, consult-
ing, and management, and extracted by regulatory commissions,
requested by congressional committees, offered gratuitously
through lobbying, or simply transferred as a result of people
changing jobs.11
The cooperation between these bureaucracies allows differ-
ent countries and companies to effect electronic forays into for-
100. Its files contain information concerning the identities, aliases, associates and
methods of international criminals. See id. Other criminal information systems
include the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) in the United States and
the Police National Computer (PNC) in the United Kingdom. See id.
7 See Anthony Oettinger, Information Resources: Knowledge and Power in
the 21st Century, SCIENCE, July 4, 1980, at 191. See generally, Arthur Miller, Per-
sonal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Infor-
mation-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1969). The number of computers
worldwide grew from 4 million to 173 million in a thirteen year period from 1981
to 1994. See Global Shift: More TV's Fewer Frogs, DET. FREE PRESS, May 22, 1995,
at 4A.
8 According to EC research, about 80% of the European employees will be
employed in jobs based in some form of information technology by the year 2000.
See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAw GROUP/EuRoPE, EUROPEAN COMPUTER LAw 1-3
(1995)[hereinafter EUROPEAN COMPUTER LAw].
9 See LOUWERS, supra note 2, at 14-17, (1995).
10 See id.
11 Marc U. Porat, The Information Economy 41-42 (1976)(unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author).
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eign turf with a minimum of time and effort. 12 The fluidity of
these information exchanges threatens traditional notions of
sovereignty. 13 It has created the need for a universal approach
to the protection of the individual's informational privacy.' 4
In October 1995, the European Union (E.U.) passed a Di-
rective on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data.' 5 The Directive establishes the duties of maintaining the
security, accuracy and completeness of information assembled
by data collectors.' 6 It also gives the data subject a considera-
ble amount of power with respect to the treatment of data col-
lected concerning him.17
While the Directive requires the creation of laws consistent
with its principles within Member States,' 8 it also prohibits
transfers of personal data to countries which fail to ensure an
12 See id.
13 We are not talking about a modest proposition here. Telepower in its vari-
ous forms - telecommunications, electronic entertainment, computer and informa-
tion services, robotics, artificial intelligence, and expert systems - is already
reshaping the global economy, internationalizing labor, and shifting jobs in space,
time, and concept. Some would argue it is rendering the nation state obsolete.
JOSEPH N. PELTON, THE GLOBALIZATION OF UNIVERSAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES, ANN. REV. OF THE INST. FOR INFO STUD. 141, 143 (1991).
14 In the United States, the debate on the definition of privacy has raged for
over one hundred years. THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1880).
In 1880, Thomas Cooley penned the phrase the "right to be let alone" as the mean-
ing of privacy. See id. The phrase was canonized by Warren and Brandeis in their
article on the right to privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). "The phrase 'a right to privacy' as
used in law has almost as many meanings as Hydra had heads." Diane Zimmer-
man, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364
(1989).
15 See Council Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter Directive]. The Directive required Member States of the
European Union to amend their national laws consistently with the provisions of
the Directive. See id. It does not have the force of law; rather the national laws
regulate the transactions subject to the Directive. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LAw GROUP/EUROPE, EUROPEAN COMPUTER LAW 1.01[21 (1995). For a description of
the political process by which the Directive was created, See Spiros Simitis, From
the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, 80
IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995).
16 See Directive, supra note 15.
17 See discussion infra concerning the provisions of the Directive. Data Sub-
ject refers to the individual whose personal information is collected.
18 See Directive, supra note 15, art. 32(1).
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"adequate level of protection." 19 The United States of America
(U.S.) has several statutes which regulate the use of personal
information in specific contexts. 20 Much has been written on
the issue of whether this panoply of laws significantly protects
the data subject's right to privacy in transfers of information
occurring solely within the borders of the U.S. 21 However, the
passage of the E.U. Directive raises the issue of the adequacy of
U.S. privacy protection laws when personal information about
E.U. nationals, originating in data banks of Member States, is
transferred to U.S. government or business interests.22
The Member States have three years to bring their laws
into comity with the provisions of the Directive. 23 They are re-
quired to adopt each Article of the Directive, but it is clear that
only "equivalent" protections must be afforded in each Member
State.24 While this may allow for some variances in the protec-
tions afforded by each Member State, the principles of the Di-
rective should probably be considered the minimum standards
of protection for the processing of personal information about
19 "The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after
transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national
provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection." Id. at art. 25(1).
20 Among the many statutes are the following: Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1994); Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994); Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o); Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3520; Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-2000aa-12; Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422; Family Educational Rights and Pri-
vacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t;
and the Video Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. For a comparison of the provisions of
these statutes to the Fair Information Practices guidelines, see Patricia Mell, Seek-
ing Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic
Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 82-85 (1996).
21 See, e.g., ARTHuR MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 24-53 (1971); Vern
Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the
Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 868-70 (1971); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a
Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11
BERKLEY. TECH. L.J. 1 (1996).
22 The 16 member states include Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, It-
aly, France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. See generally CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, THE
EU: UNDERSTANDING THE BRUSSELS PROCESS (1995).
23 See Directive, supra note 15, art. 32. This means that compliance must be
accomplished by October 24, 1998.
24 See id.
1997]
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nationals within Member States. Meeting these minimum re-
quirements should therefore satisfy the requirement of "ade-
quate protections" in non-Member States under Article 25 of the
Directive.
It is not too early to scrutinize some of the existing privacy
laws in the United States in the attempt to determine their "ad-
equacy" under the Directive. 25 This article begins with a brief
comparison of the principles upon which the protection of infor-
mational privacy is based in both the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union.26 Next, the article discusses certain major
components of the Directive by comparing them to the provi-
sions of federal privacy protection statutes. It is only in compar-
ison to these central provisions that the "adequacy" of any U.S.
statute should be judged. The article concludes that in some
instances, the laws, though not perfect, are "adequate". Some
statutes however, do not rise to the necessary level of accepta-
bility under the Directive and need to be revised.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE
PROTECTION OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND IN THE E.U.
A. Conceptual differences Between the U.S. and the E. U.
There are significant conceptual differences between the
system of law in the U.S. and that of most E.U. Member
States. 27 In the U.S. there has been a long and pronounced de-
25 See Directive, supra note 15.
26 This is not meant to be an exhaustive review of the long common law his-
tory in the development of privacy concepts in the United States and their relation
to the protection of computerized information. Rather the focus of this article is the
nature of selected federal statutes which regulate the collection, and dissemination
of personal information about individuals. See generally Edward J. Bloustein, Pri-
vacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
962 (1964); RICHARD TURKINGTON, ET. AL, PRIVACY CASES AND MATERIALS (1992)(for
a more in depth review of the principles of privacy). There is also significant litera-
ture dealing with the nature of privacy in the new technological age. See, e.g.,
Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and
the Computer, 49 TEx. L. REV. 137 (1971); ALAN WESTIN & MICHAEL BAKER, DATA
BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY (1972); Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893 (1984).
27 See EUROPEAN COMPUTER LAw, supra note 10 at 1. The U.S. shares a com-
mon law tradition with the U.K., and the Republic of Ireland of the EU. See id.
The remainder of the EU nations have legal systems based on the civil law. See id.
This means that there are differences in the way in which the common law coun-
[Vol. 9:147
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bate as to the nature of privacy and its parameters in the con-
text of computerized personal information. 28 The sources of
federal "privacy law" in the U.S. are the common law and a vari-
ety of statutes. 29 The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly list
privacy as one of its guarantees.30
The source of the protection afforded personal information
in the Directive is Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.3 '
The Convention guarantees the right of privacy for "private and
family life, . . . home ... and correspondence."3 2 Although the
Directive does not directly define privacy, its parameters are
given through the creation of both substantive rights for the in-
dividual and duties for users and collectors of the information.
The advantage to this Civil Law approach is that the E.U.
avoided the arduous process of creating a comprehensive defini-
tries and the civil law countries view the interpretation of statutes, the relative
importance of case law, and the importance of academic writings. See id.
28 See Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281 (1966); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421 (1980)(for a variety of
definitions of 'privacy').
29 Although there is no generalized right to privacy under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the First and Fourth Amendments provide for privacy in certain contexts.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized a penumbral right to privacy in mat-
ters of intimacy and marital choice. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The tort of the invasion of privacy was created by Thomas Cooley and rede-
fined by Prosser. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1880). Wil-
liam L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Finally, there are federal
statutes, which regulate the processing of personal information in specific con-
texts. In this article, I evaluate the 'adequacy' of four of these statutes. See discus-
sion infra part III.
30 Privacy under the U.S. Constitution comes in the form of protection against
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the right to
free association under the First amendment. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S.
Supreme Court created a "penumbral" right of privacy in a narrow area of procrea-
tion. See Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Other extensions of the
right to privacy include the right to an abortion.
31 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 UNTS 221 (1950) [hereinafter Convention]. The pro-
visions of the Convention supersede national law and are applicable by their own
force and effect. See generally M. CHERIF BAssioUmN, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
IN U.S. LAw AND PRACTICE, Vol. II, Chapter IX (1983).
32 Convention, supra note 31, at art. 8(1). These rights are limited under the
Convention by the dictates of "law and [are] necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security.. ." Id. at art. 8(2).
1997]
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tion of privacy which has plagued U.S. law. 33 While the option
has been discussed in the U.S., neither the U.S., nor the E.U.
has made privacy a property right.3 4 Despite these conceptual
differences, the economic and societal forces that drove the de-
velopment of informational privacy protections in both the U.S.
and the E.U. are similar. However, the legal method by which
the U.S. and E.U. addressed the problem of providing for infor-
mational privacy is markedly different.
B. Economic and Societal Trends Giving Rise to the
Information Society
In the U.S., as in the E.U., the shift from an industrial
economy to information economy is the basis of the surge in use
of personal information. 35 The "new" world economy is based
upon selling personal and professional services rather than sell-
ing of manufactured goods. 36 This new economy came to be
known as the "Post Industrial Society" or the "Information
Economy".37
The merging of audio and visual communications with com-
puters has resulted in the development of a flexible and diverse
international information-exchange system. This integrated
system allows the nearly instantaneous transfer of information
through cables, satellites, microwave relays and fiber optics.3 8
33 For examples of the numerous definitions of privacy, see RICHARD C. TURK-
INGTON, ET. AL, PRIVACY CASES AND MATERIALS (1992).
34 See Diane Lehneer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as
Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 667 (1992). See generally Mell, supra note 20.
35 See generally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF THE POST-INDuSTRL SOCIETY
47-119 (1973).
36 See Daniel Bell, Communications Technology-For Better or for Worse, HARV.
Bus. REV., May-June 1979, at 20.
37 Id. at 22.
38 See id. at 21. The growth of this international system was supported by the
downward trend in the cost of computer systems. See id. The first commercial
computer was built in 1951 at a cost of $701,000. See id. The computer occupied 10
cubic feet. The same amount of computing power can today be stored in a one-
centimeter square silicon chip that costs $19. See JAMES V. VERARGI & VIRGINIA
SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAw 247 (1991). From
1952 to 1980, the average computer system cost dropped from $1.26 to $0.0025 per
100,000 calculations. COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 4 fig. 2
(Stephen J. Andriole ed., 1984) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND
PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT, FEDERAL DATA PROCESSING REORGANIZA-
TION STUDY: BASIC REPORT OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TEAM 29-30 (1978)).
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The information generates substantial revenues for its col-
lectors. 39 Many states within the U.S. use personal information
as a revenue generating resource.40 The information industry
represents a significant source of employment for government
and commercial operations alike. 41 In the E.U., economic com-
petition between Member States is not only for jobs created by
the information economy, but also for the revenue derived from
processing the data itself.42
Less technologically advanced countries have become de-
pendent upon the more developed countries for information
processing services. 43 The inability of the less developed coun-
tries to fully participate in the manipulation of data originating
within their borders creates what one commentator referred to
as an "information proletariat."44 Countries that cannot per-
form their own data processing run the risk of their economies
lagging in job development within the information economy. 45
In the U.S., the drive to exclude access to data collected
pursuant to governmental mandate resulted in the imposition
of policies that restricted the flow of valuable information. For
example, one state government attempted to exclude a private,
commercial enterprise from selling data processed by the
state.46 Additionally, the U.S. government controls the export
39 In 1988 alone, the combined revenues of the three largest credit bureaus
totaled almost 900 million dollars. See Jeffrey Rothfelder, Is Nothing Private?,
Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 80.
40 40 states sell the information they receive from dealings with the members
of the public to private industry. See Big Brother May Be Closer Than You
Thought, Bus. WK., Feb. 9,1987, at 85.
41 The late Commerce Secretary, Ronald H. Brown, remarked that the infor-
mation sector accounts for more than 10% of the Gross National Product. See Com-
merce Secretary Ronald H. Brown, Brown Lists Clinton Administration's Advisor
on Information Infrastructure, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTrVEs, Jan 7, 1994. At an ad-
dress of the National Press Club, Vice President Albert Gore reported that one-half
to two-thirds of all U.S. workers are employed in information economy jobs. See
VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRucTURE TASK
FORCE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRuCTURE AGENDA FOR ACTION 5 (1993).
42 See LouwERs, supra note 2, at 16-17.
43 See J. BECKER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL OR-
DER (1984). See also Ennison, Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flow in Develop-
ing Countries: Sovereignty Considerations, 1984 INT'L Bus. LAW. 163.
44 LouwERs, supra note 2, at 16-17.
45 See id.
46 See Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985). In this case, Legi-
Tech sought access to New York State legislative developments. See id. It wanted
1997]
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of technical data through the Export Administration Act,47
while Germany, a Member State, imposes a duty upon proces-
sors to do the work locally.48
Since computers were invented in the 1940's, they have
been used as a fundamental tool in the operation of govern-
ment, commercial and academic industries. 49 As in the U.S.,
the E.U. Member States were forced to find an efficient means
of information processing to aid their decision making. Often
this need required Member States to rely on information stored
on foreign soil. This dependence has the potential to tip the bal-
ance of power between sovereign states, 50 as well as creating
conflict between western and "third world" nations.51
From the individual's viewpoint, the problems of centraliza-
tion of data are the same in both the U.S. and the E.U. The
magnitude and diversity of the population has isolated the gov-
ernment from its constituents while requiring greater contact in
the form of government backed support.52 The collection of this
personal information and the maintenance of these files is a sig-
nificant consequence of the variety and concentration of institu-
tional relationships with individuals. 53 The balance between
the institution seeking better information and the individual
to market the information for a fee. See id. Since the state of New York sold the
material itself, it denied access to Legi-Tech. See id. The Court held that New
York could not deny access to Legi-Tech, but that it could charge Legi-Tech a fee
for the data. See id.
47 Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1980).
48 See Trade Barriers to Telecommunications, Data and Information Services,
4 TRANSNAT'L DATA & COM. REP., at 179 (June 1982).
49 See Mell, supra note 20, at 19.
50 "Information has an economic value and the ability to store and process
certain types of data may well give one country political and technological advan-
tage over other countries. This in turn may lead to a loss of national sovereignty
through supra-national data flows." Statement of Louis Joinet, French Magistrate
at the Vienna Symposium of 1977, cited in Zimmerman, Transborder Data Flows:
Problems with the Council of Europe Convention, or Protecting States from Protec-
tionism, N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus 18 (1982).
51 This friction has been apparent between the U.S. and Canada. Robinson,
Extraterritoriality and Data Flows, TRANSNAT'L DATA & COM. REP., June 1986, at
27. A large amount of Canadian data is processed in the U.S. See id.
52 The federal U.S. government collects a average of 18 files on each man,
woman and child in the U.S. See ROBERT E. SMITH, PRIVACY: HOW TO PROTECT
WHAT's LEFT OF IT 82 (1982). The state government collects an average of 15 files
on each resident. See id.
53 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA-
TION SOCIETY 4 (1977).
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seeking to control the dissemination of personal information
has shifted in favor of the institution due to the anonymity with
which the institutions operate. 54 This imbalance prompted the
creation of post-industrial society's label, the "dossier society."55
The anonymity of the information system's operation divests
the individual of any real power over the use of personal
information. 56
C. Development of Legal Protections of Computer Processed
Personal Information
The international diffusion of data protection policies in the
1960's and 1970's was the result of a series of common events
across Western Europe and North America.5 7 Four catalysts
were identified: the consideration of the creation of centralized
data banks; the proposal for the creation of universal personal
identification numbers for citizens; the decennial census of
1970; and the publication of several books describing the emer-
gence of a surveillance society. 58 As a result of the policy de-
bates concerning the effect of computers on informational
privacy, several statutes regulating privacy on the national
level were enacted. 59 In turn, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.), the Council of Eu-
rope, and the European Union sought to develop guidelines for
the consistent treatment of computerized personal information
across international borders.
54 See SMITH, supra note 52, at 90.
55 Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier
and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 837-39 (1971).
56 See KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY, FINAL REPORT TO
THE OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ExEcuTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
42 (1976).
57 "Diffusion" refers to the process by which policy innovations spread from
one country to another. See HAROLD WILENSKY ET AL., COMPARATIVE SOCIAL Pol-
ICY: THEORIES, METHODS, FINDINGS IN CoMPARATIVE POLICY RESEARCH: LEARNING
FROM EXPERIENCE, 389-90 (M. Dierkes, H.N. Weiler, and A.B. Antal eds, 1987).
58 For a discussion of these factors, see COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRI-
VACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 46-
55 (1992).
59 The first such statute was enacted in Sweden in 1973, followed by the U.S.
in 1974 and by West Germany and Canada in 1977. See id. at 57 citing Status of
Data Protection /Privacy Legislation, TRANSNATL DATA & COMM. REP., various
issues.
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The O.E.C.D.6° studied the problem beginning in 1974.
Their study resulted in the enactment of the O.E.C.D. Guide-
lines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data in 1980.61 These guidelines covered the
automatic processing of personal data in both the public and
private sectors. 62
Beginning in the 1960's, the Council of Europe became
aware of the threat posed to individuals by the unregulated
computerization of personal information files.63 Their concern
was based on the requirements of Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. 64 In response to these concerns,
the Council of Ministers adopted two resolutions, one dealing
with the private sector in 1973, another in 1974 regulating the
activities of the public sector.65
The drawing of a distinction between the data processing
activities of the private and the public sector was consistent
with the U.S. approach. There was considerable debate in the
U.S. as to whether a distinction between government (public)
information collection and collection by the private industries
was justified.66 In the end however, the U.S. treated the regula-
tion of government data processing activities separately.
By contrast, in 1980, the European Council of Ministers
adopted an omnibus approach to the problem of computerized
information in the Council of Europe Convention. 67 The Con-
60 The O.E.C.D. is made up of 24 member nations: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West-Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States.
61 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recom-
mendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58 (Final) of Oct. 1, 1980,
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981).
62 See GREENAWALT, supra note 56.
63 See LOUWERS, supra note 2, at 17-22.
64 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
65 See LouwERs, supra note 2, at 17-22.
66 See GREENAWALT, supra, note 58.
67 For an analysis of both the Convention and the OECD guidelines, see Bing
The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines on Data Protection,
MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1971).
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vention had general international application 6 and covered the
automatic treatment of data concerning identifiable natural
persons. After the adoption of the Convention, the Committee
of Experts rendered several recommendations on the protection
of various types of personal information processing. 69
The first comprehensive attempt to develop standards for
the protection of computer processed information in the U.S.
was the 1973 report issued by the Advisory Committee on Auto-
mated Data Systems, a subcommittee of the Health Education
and Welfare Committee. The report, entitled, "Personal Data
Systems: Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens," listed
five factors considered necessary to protect an individual's in-
terest in personal information collected about him. 70 The fed-
eral response to this report was to pass several different
statutes; each protecting privacy in one specific context, but
each statute was ostensibly based on these five principles. 71
The European Parliament was also active in advocating the
protection of computer processed information. In the 1970's, it
began requesting the establishment of rules, which would guar-
68 Opened for signature in January 1981, it became effective when France,
Germany, Norway, Spain and Sweden ratified it. See LouwERS, supra note 2, at
17-22.
69 The Committee of Experts submitted recommendations on a variety of
types of data including medical data and research and statistical data. See
LouwERs, supra note 2, at 17-22. The recommendations were not legally binding.
See id.
70 The five factors were as follows: 1) The individual should be able to find
out what files concerning him exist; 2) When the individual provides information
concerning himself, he should know how the information is to be used and how
broadly the information is to be disclosed; 3) If the record holder wants to disclose
the information more broadly than originally contemplated, consent of the subject
of the record should be obtained; 4) The individual should have access to fies con-
cerning him and the opportunity to correct outmoded information should be up-
dated; and 5) Files should be afforded adequate security and outmoded
information should be updated. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SECRE-
TARY'S ADVISORY COM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, REcORDs, COM-
PUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41-42 (1973)[hereinafter HEW REPORT].
71 Among the statutes enacted were the following: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C § 552a (1994); Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5
U.S.C § 552a(o) (1994); Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-2000aa-
12 (1994); Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C § 552 (1994); Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994); Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994); Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t (1994); Video Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(1994).
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antee the individual protections against the growing perceived
threat of computerization of personal information. 72 While in-
dividual member states enacted national legislation to prevent
data processing abuse, the first European Union effort in this
regard was made in 1981. 73 In that year, the European Com-
mission recommended that Member States ratify the 1981 Data
Protection Convention of the Council of Europe. 74 This Conven-
tion provided guidelines for individual member states to follow
in drafting their own legislation. The first draft of the current
Directive was presented in September 1990.75
D. An Overview of the EU Directive and U.S. Data Protection
Laws
The Directive is divided into seven chapters and thirty
three Articles, which define not only the rights of the data sub-
ject, but, also outline the duties of the data collector and proces-
sor to both the data subject and to third parties who want
access to the data.76 The Directive places limitations on the
permissible content of records and creates substantive rights in
the data subject.77
The Directive requires member states to modify their na-
tional laws to include the minimum standards it has estab-
lished. This means that despite the Directive's goal of
harmonizing European law, the actualization of those principles
could vary between member states. This raises the question of
whether the adequacy of the third country's data protection pro-
visions are to be judged by the national laws of the individual
Member State involved, or whether the minimum requirements
of the Directive are the benchmark of adequacy. Due to the Di-
rective's goal of harmonizing the laws of the member states, it
72 See 1976 O.J. (C 100) 27; 1979 O.J. (C140) 147; 1982 O.J. (C87) 39.
73 The Swedish Data Bank Statute, enacted in 1973, served as the model for
European data protection laws. See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN
THE COMPUTER AGE 128-129 (1987). Within four years, West Germany, France and
Denmark had enacted data protection legislation as well. See id.
74 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Persona Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, Eur.T.S.No. 108
(hereinafter Convention).
75 See Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individu-
als in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3.
76 See Directive, supra note 15.
77 See discussion of the provisions of the Directive infra Part II. D.
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might be that national variances must be viewed as subordinate
to the rights extended to the individual under the Directive.
The rights given to the data subject are bolstered by the
duties imposed upon the data collector to ensure informational
privacy. 78 The substantive rights given individuals under the
Directive echo the five principles proposed by the HEW Re-
port.79 The Directive, however, clarifies the parameters of in-
formational privacy by imposing specific duties, for
maintenance of the privacy, on the data collector. Pursuant to
the Directive, the adequacy of the protections afforded by the
third country is necessarily contextual, considering all of the
circumstances surrounding the data transfer exchange. This
would include an inquiry into: 1) the nature of the data; 2) the
purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation; 3)
the country of origin; 4) the country of final destination; 5) the
rules of law in force and professional rules; and 6) security
measures.80 Despite the goal of harmonizing the treatment of
the processing of personal information, the Directive also pro-
vides a series of derogations from compliance with its
provisions.8l
78 Under the Directive, "[tihe collector has the duty to fairly and lawfully pro-
cess the information, to restrict its collection of data to specified explicit and legiti-
mate purposes, to only take such information as is necessary for the stated
purposes, to maintain the accuracy and completeness of the data, and not to main-
tain the data any longer than is necessary for the stated purposes of the data
processing." Directive, supra note 15, art. 6.
79 See HEW REPORT, supra note 72.
80 Since context is the key in the determination of adequacy, and because the
Directive gives the parties the ability to contract specific terms in the transfer of
data, there should not be inordinate difficulty in the US government or businesses
trading information with Member States.
81 Directive, supra note 15, art. 26 (1), (2). Pursuant to Article 26, there are
several circumstances under which a member state may allow the transfer of per-
sonal data to a third country that does not insure an adequate level of protection.
Those circumstances occur when the data subject has "unambiguously" given his
consent to the transfer; transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract be-
tween the data subject and the controller or the implementation of precontractual
measures; transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third
party; transfer is necessary on public interest grounds; transfer is necessary in
order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; the transfer is made from
information which is already public; or the controller, by contract adduces suffi-
cient guarantees. Id. The derogations allow a commercial enterprise from a "non-
conforming" country to contract for the ability to transfer data from a Member
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The U.S. has at least nine federal statutes that regulate
some aspect of informational privacy.8 2 Some statutes regulate
the activities of the federal government, and others regulate the
data processing activities of private industry. To determine the
"adequacy" of U.S. legislation, the major provisions of the E.U.
Directive will be compared with the major provisions of certain
U.S. legislation. The analysis assumes that data exchanges are
being requested of a mythical E.U. Member State that has
adopted the Directive without modification. In this hypotheti-
cal, the request is being made by a collector based in the U.S.
The U.S. statutes used in this analysis are The Privacy Act
(PA),83 The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
(CMPPA),84 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),8 5 and the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).6 The
purpose of each statute and the nature of the records covered by
it are a necessary part of the review. Each of the four statutes
deal with a specific type of record or with processing performed
by a particular collector.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF U.S.
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY STATUTES UNDER THE
E.U. DIRECTIVE
A. Purpose of the Provisions
The Directive deals with the treatment of personal informa-
tion or data. Personal data is defined as "any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable person. An identifiable
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity."8 7
State. This allows for widely varying treatment of information. For the purpose of
this Article, the derogations provided under Article 26, will not be considered.
82 See list of statutes supra note 73.
83 See Privacy Act (PA) of 1974, 5 U.S.C § 552a (1994).
84 See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1994).
85 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, (FCRA) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994).
86 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (1994).
87 Directive, supra note 15, art. 2(a).
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Article 1 of the Directive establishes privacy with respect to
the processing of personal data as a "fundamental right and
freedom of natural persons."88 This right is not absolute. The
Directive provides that "[mlember states shall neither restrict
nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member
States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under
paragraph 1."89
The determination of "privacy" as a fundamental right in
E.U. Member States creates presumptions in favor of the indi-
vidual's power over personal data. By way of contrast, neither
the U.S. Constitution nor any of the current federal statutes es-
tablish privacy as a fundamental right.90 Consequently, U.S.
law presumed the right of the collector to disclose information
in his possession. This presumption of "disclosurability" is evi-
dent in most U.S. statutes.
The PA was enacted as an amendment to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).91 Its stated purpose was to give indi-
viduals a right to request access to records maintained about
them and to prevent agency disclosure of personal information
to third parties without the subject's consent. 92 A significant
limitation on the protection of the individual's right to privacy
is that in a conflict between the PA and FOIA's disclosure re-
quirements, FOIA would generally prevail. 93
88 Id. art. 1(1). This necessarily excludes business entities such as corpora-
tions. See id.
89 Id. art. 1(2).
90 See discussion infra part III.C.
91 See Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (This statute
was enacted to promote open government by disclosing information relating to the
workings of government). For the specific provision of the PA referred to above,
see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994).
92 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (1994). This section also requires that the subject
be given a written copy of the record concerning him and that the copy be in a form
comprehensible to the individual. See id. Subject to limitations to be discussed
below, the individual must first "discover" that such a record exists before he can
request access to it. See discussion infra part III. D. 1.
93 "No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, ex-
cept pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be-
... required under section 552(FOIA)." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). See also Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Reg-
ulation in the United States, 80 IowA L. REV. 553, 593 (1995).
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The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
(CMPPA) amends the PA to restrict the collection of informa-
tion from individuals. 94 It guides government agencies in the
performance of data matching activities about the same individ-
ual. The matches are not limited to government data banks,
but can include data from commercial enterprises as well. Such
far-reaching access can easily impact an E.U. resident.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) regulates the data
disclosure activities of consumer reporting agencies 95 (CRA) to
third parties. 96 The FCRA requires CRA's to adopt "reasonable
procedures" which would meet commerce's need for personal in-
formation about individuals but would do so with fairness and
equity to the consumer in terms of confidentiality, accuracy, rel-
evance and proper use of the information. 97 The FCRA, like the
Directive, seeks to prevent unreasonable or careless invasions
of the individual's privacy but not to preclude the dissemination
of information. 98
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA) grants individuals the right of access to their own "ed-
ucation records" 99 and prevents disclosure of those records to
94 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (This statute is used to determine the individual's
eligibility to receive federal benefits or to discover fraud). See generally Donsia
Renee Strong, Comment, The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of
1988: Necessary Relief From the Erosion of the Privacy Act of 1974, 2 SOFrWARE
L.J. 391 (1988). As an amendment to the PA, it carries the PA's deficiencies in
coverage. See id.
95 A consumer reporting agency is defined as "[a]ny person which, for mone-
tary fees, dues or on a cooperative basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in
the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other in-
formation on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1994).
96 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t.
97 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
98 In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007 (D.C. Mich. 1978); Conley v. TRW Credit
Data, 381 F.Supp. 473 (D.C. Ill. 1974); Williams v. Equifax Credit Information
Services, 892 F. Supp. 951(E.D. Mich. 1995).
99 "For the purpose of this section, the term 'education records' means, except
as may be provided otherwise in subparagraph (B), those records, files, documents,
and other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and
(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for
such agency or institution." Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(4)(A).
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third parties without consent. 100 Education records include in-
formation concerning the student and parent's finances, confi-
dential letters of recommendation, and academic educational
records of every level of schooling. 10 1 Unlike the PA, FERPA is
not limited to students who are U.S. nationals or permanent
residents. 10 2 This provision operates when foreign students ap-
ply and matriculate in U.S. schools and universities.
B. Scope of Records Covered by the Directive
Pursuant to Article 3, the Directive applies to the process-
ing of personal data by computer, whether automatic or partly
automatic. 0 3 Manual data processing is covered only if it is
part of the personal data filing system. 0 4 Also exempted from
coverage is processing done by natural persons for personal or
household purposes. 0 5
Article 7 lists several alternative conditions precedent to
the processing of personal data based on the presumption in
favor of the individual's power to control personal information
concerning him.'0 6 The first condition is that the data subject
has "unambiguously given his consent" to the processing. 0 7
Implicit in this provision is notice to the individual that data
concerning him has been requested. While this does not mean
that the individual necessarily had prior knowledge of the exist-
ence of the file, this article makes it clear that the individual
100 The right of access for students under 18 years of age resides in the par-
ent(s). See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994).
101 See id. at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1).
102 "[The term student includes any person with respect to whom an educa-
tional agency or institution maintains education records or personally identifiable
information, but does not include a person who has not been in attendance at such
agency or institution." Id. at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6).
103 Directive, supra note 15, art. 3(1).
104 Personal data filing system is defined as "any structured set of personal
data, which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralized, de-
centralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis. See id. art 2.
105 Directive, supra note 15, art. 3(2). "[Tlhe council and commission consider
the expression 'purely personal or household activity' must not make it possible to
exclude from the scope of the directive the processing of personal data by a natural
person, where such data are disclosed not to one or more persons but to an indeter-
minate number of persons." Statements for Entry in the Minutes Accompanying
the Draft Directive, 4730/95 Annex 1 at 3.
106 See id. art. 7.
107 See id. art. 7(a).
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will be made aware of its existence before a disclosure of the
information can be made. Two other conditions under Article 7
permit processing of personal data to facilitate contract obliga-
tions of the data subject both before the contract is entered and
as necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data
subject is a party.'0 8 These conditions imply knowledge on the
part of the data subject, but apparently allow processing with-
out requiring his express consent.
Several of the provisions of Article 7 concern official activi-
ties of collectors or third parties when processing personal data.
Processing under these provisions do not seem to require prior
knowledge of either the existence of the file or the request for
the information. These provisions permit processing which is
necessary:
for compliance with the controller's legal obligation;' 0 9 for the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third
party to whom the data is disclosed;" 0° and for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or third party un-
less they are overridden by the data subject's fundamental rights
and freedoms."'
The Directive does not indicate how these "legitimate interests"
are to be determined.
Article 9 contains exemptions to these conditions. A unique
Directive exemption provides for processing personal data car-
ried on for journalistic purposes.112 There is no single Constitu-
tional or statutory provision in the U.S. comparable to this
108 See id. art 7(b).
109 Directive, supra note 15, art. 7c.
110 Id. art. 7e.
111 Id. art. 7f. The explanatory memorandum to the 1992 Draft stated that the
"balance-of-interest clause is likely to concern very different kinds of processing,
such as direct mail marketing and the use of data which are already a matter of
public record." Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, Oct. 15, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C311130) 35.
112 "Member states shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the provi-
sions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal
data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary
expressiom onlu if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the
rules governing freedom of expression." Directive, supra note 15, art. 9.
[Vol. 9:147
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol9/iss1/4
TRANS-BORDER DATA EXCHANGES
Article. 113 This provision has met with the criticism that it is
both overbroad and too narrow." 4 Due to the history of U.S.
law in this area, it is doubtful that such a provision could be
adopted in the U.S.1 5
The Directive has wide and general application to the
processing of personal data within the E.U. No single U.S. stat-
ute has such general application. However, the Privacy Act is
fairly comprehensive in its coverage of governmental data
banks. It covers "records" about an "individual" in a "system of
records" held by federal agencies. By definition, this excludes
the activities of commercial enterprises. The term "records"
means any information revealing something about the individ-
ual." 6 The PA defines the "individual" as a "citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence." 117 A "system of records" is any group of records under
agency control that is indexed and can be retrievable by an indi-
vidual's name or other identifier." 8
The PA is a restriction upon the federal government's abil-
ity to collect and process information. It does not apply to pri-
vate industry. An even greater deficiency is that the PA does
not apply to nonresident aliens." 9 These deficiencies mean
that the PA provides no protection against the disclosure of per-
sonal data for the citizens of an E.U. Member State.
While not identical, the records covered by the PA substan-
tially match those protected under the Directive. The limitation
of protection for U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens re-
mains a significant problem. The fact that the PA applies only
to federal data systems is relevant only if the statutes regulat-
ing non-governmental data processing are found lacking in the
protection they afford informational privacy.
113 The tension between the freedom of the press and the individual's right to
privacy is rumored to have been at the basis of the Warren and Brandeis article on
The Right to Privacy. See supra note 14.
114 See James R. Maxeiner, Business Information and "Personal Data: Some
Common-Law Observations About the EU Draft Data Protection Directive, 80 IowA
L. REV. 619, 634 (1995).
115 See Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and the First Amend-
ment: Why a "Press Exemption " Won't Work, 80 IowA L REV. 639 (1995).
116 See Privacy Act (PA) of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1994).
117 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2).
118 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5).
119 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(2)(a).
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The CMPPA broadly covers all records held by federal gov-
ernmental agencies. Its application is limited however to those
records which would be used to perform a matching activity. 120
Since it is an amendment to the PA, it too would not protect
non-U.S. citizens or non-permanent resident aliens.
The FCRA applies to records about consumers held by con-
sumer reporting agencies. 121 This would also exempt records
held by an entity that did not regularly engage in the dissemi-
nation of information and those which did not charge a fee for
such information. 122 The greatest limitation in FCRA's scope is
that it only regulates the use of information primarily for fam-
ily, household, employment and insurance purposes. 123 This ex-
cludes use of information for business purposes.124 Also
excluded are reports concerning authorization and approval of
credit card transactions. 125
Unlike the Directive, the FCRA is not limited to computer
stored information. 126 FCRA is also not hampered by the PA's
limitation of applicability to U.S. citizens or resident aliens.
The three international credit bureaus collect and maintain
files of several million individuals around the world. 127 The im-
pact of this statute on E.U. nationals seems evident.
FERPA applies to records maintained by any educational
institution, which receives funding from the federal govern-
ment.128 There are probably very few educational institutions
120 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(A)-(D).
121 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C §§ 1681-1681t
(1994). "The term 'consumer' means an individual." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 'The
term 'person' means any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooper-
ative association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other en-
tity." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b). The records are either "consumer reports" or
"investigative consumer reports." See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)-(e).
122 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) which exempts records concerning a creditor's
dealings with its own debtor.
123 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)-(e).
124 See generally Zeller v. Samia, 758 F. Supp. 775 (D. Mass. 1991); Williams v.
Equifax Credit Information Services, 892 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
125 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
126 FCRA covers all records or files on the consumer "recorded and retained by
a Consumer Reporting Agency regardless of how the information is stored." 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(g). The Directive excludes records if they are not compiled at least
partly by automatic means. See Directive, supra note 15, art. 3(1).
127 In 1988, Trans Union, TRW, and Equifax held a combined 410 million files
on individuals. Jeffrey Rothfelder, Is Nothing Private?, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989.
128 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).
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in the U.S. which do not receive some federal aid. Therefore,
this statute probably has universal application to the many
E.U. nationals who attend an educational institution in the
U.S.129
C. Use of Data and Permissible Content
Article 6 of the Directive creates duties for the data collec-
tor and user that protect the data subject. 130 These duties
loosely fall under the heading of "data quality" and are the ba-
sic assumptions upon which the substantive rights of the data
subject are built. They require that accuracy and relevance be
maintained, limitation of collection to specified purposes, expul-
sion of stale data, delineation of permissible use of the data, and
designation of impermissible subject matter for files. 131 The re-
quirements of the U.S. statutes vary, but each shares the Direc-
tive's concerns with accuracy and limitations on the uses of
data.
Article 6(1) requires that the data be processed fairly and
lawfully. It requires that the data be collected for a specified,
explicit, and legitimate purpose and not further processed in a
way incompatible with those purposes. 132 Finally, the data col-
lected must be adequate, relevant and not excessive for the pur-
pose collected or further processed. 133 Accuracy of the data
must be assured by reasonable steps, and inaccurate or incom-
plete data must be erased or corrected.'3 4 Finally, the data
should not be kept in a form which can identify the subject for
any longer than is necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which data is collected. 135 Subsection two places the duty of en-
129 Even state universities must comply with the requirements of FERPA. See
Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University, 97 Mich. App. 5, 294 N.W.2d 228
(1980), affd 414 Mich. 510, 327 N.W.2d 783 (1982).
130 The controller is "the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
any other body which alone or jointly with other determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data." Id. art. 2(d).
131 See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497 (1995).
132 Directive, supra note 15, art. 6(1)(b).
133 See id. art. 6(1) (a)-(e).
134 See id. art. 6(d).
135 See id. art. 6(e). The manner of determining the timeliness of the informa-
tion is not specified in the Directive.
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suring compliance with paragraph one upon the controller of
the personal data. 136
The PA does require that all information collected be rele-
vant for the agency's purpose.' 37 The Act also requires the
agency to maintain such "accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and
completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness" in
decisions made about the data subject. 138 A presumption of rel-
evance and propriety of purpose assists the agency in its collec-
tion activities. There is no express requirement that "stale"
information be purged at any particular time. The CMPPA
shares the presumption of relevance with the PA. The agency is
required, however, to do an independent check of the informa-
tion before it can take adverse action against the data
subject. 139
Under the FCRA, the CRA is required to assure the maxi-
mum possible accuracy of the information by maintaining rea-
sonable procedures. The verification procedures to be used are
not outlined in the statute. Consequently, the reasonableness
of the procedures is left up to the CRA. "Reasonableness" has
been interpreted to mean what a reasonably prudent person
would have done to verify the data under the circumstances.14 0
Conversely, if the data is determined to be accurate, then the
reasonableness of the CRA's procedures will not be ques-
tioned.' 41 Contextual accuracy is not required. 42 Unlike the
Directive and the PA, the FCRA specifies the time after which
the information must be deleted from the file.'4 3 The FCRA
also requires that users identify themselves and certify that
they are using the information for proper purposes.'4 It has
136 See id. art. 2(d). The controller is "the natural or legal person, public au-
thority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with other determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data.. ." Id.
137 See Privacy Act (PA) of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (1994).
138 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5).
139 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(E), (p)(1)(A)(I).
140 See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
141 See McPhee v. Chilton Corp., 468 F. Supp. 494 (D. Conn. 1978).
142 Austin v. Bankamerica Service Corp., 41F. Supp. 730(D.C. Ga. 1974). But
see Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d, 37(C.A. D.C. 1984).
143 Most information is not reported after it is seven years old. Files concerning
cases under Title 11 and Bankruptcy remain in the files for ten years. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681c.
144 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e.
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been demonstrated that the CRA's rarely check the validity of
the user's stated purpose. 145
By its language, the FCRA could be said to meet the Direc-
tive's standard of "adequacy." However, the history of the stat-
ute shows that in truth, the individual's privacy is not fully
protected. The failure of the FCRA to ensure contextual accu-
racy would seem to be at odds with Directive's requirement of
fairness and accuracy. The lax interpretation of "reasonable
procedures" also poses a problem for ensuring consistent treat-
ment of individuals. The provisions requiring the certification
of the user's identity and purposes for the information request
lack the type of strict enforcement which would truly protect
the individual's informational privacy.
FERPA does not directly require accuracy to be maintained
in the education records. Since it allows easy access and pre-
disclosure consent of the data subject, it would seem that the
data subject is well positioned to rectify any errors. 146 Despite
its silence on the issue, FERPA would probably meet the Direc-
tive's adequacy standards.
The Directive also provides for the exclusion of certain data
content. Article 8 prohibits the processing of data which reveals
the race, ethnic origin, political opinion and religious or philo-
sophical beliefs of the individual. 147 In the U.S., only the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act specifically prohibits the collection and
use, by creditors, of information concerning the individual's
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, marital status, age or
receipt of public assistance benefits.' 48 Also prohibited from
145 In 1983, a sales manager of a car dealership used his ability to validly ac-
cess a credit bureau computer's files to perpetrate a fraud. JOHN M. CARROLL, CON-
FIDENTIAL INFORMATION SOURCES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 166-67 (1991). In the
attempt to "launder" one individual's credit (offender) he obtained the credit
records and social security number of another individual with excellent credit (vic-
tim). See id. He matched the offender with a victim whose name was very similar
and whose profession was the same. See id. Next, he assisted the offender in ap-
plying for over $25,000 credit under the victim's name. See id. The scheme was
exposed when the offender defaulted and the victim was notified. See id. Hackers
also pose a problem to the security of data files. See id. Michael Synergy is
credited with having successfully retrieved the credit record of former President
Ronald Reagan. Crime Bytes Back, OMNI, Aug. 1990.
146 See discussion infra part III.D.2. on access rights under FERPA.
147 Directive, supra note 15, art. 8(1).
148 Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.,
12 C.F.R. § 202. Two additional prohibitions include the use of information con-
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disclosure under the Directive is information revealing the indi-
vidual's trade union membership and data concerning the indi-
vidual's health or sex life. 149 These prohibitions are lifted when
the individual gives explicit consent or discloses the information
himself.150
In the U.S., the fact of an individual's membership in a
trade union might be protected from disclosure under the Free-
dom of Association provided by the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.1 5' The prohibition on the disclosure of mat-
ters concerning the individual's sex life is enforced only as it
falls under the "penumbral" right of individuals to control their
own lives in highly personal matters.1 52 The collection of infor-
mation concerning the individual's character, general reputa-
tion, personal characteristics, and mode of living is specifically
allowed as an investigative consumer report under the
FCRA.153
D. Substantive Rights Afforded the Individual
Under the Directive, the data subject exercises a considera-
ble amount of control over the treatment of personal informa-
tion concerning him. Some of the significant rights afforded the
data subject are: (1) the right to receive notice of the file's exist-
ence; (2) the right to access the file; (3) the insuring of restric-
tions on the collection of the information; and (4) restrictions on
the secondary use of the information. The rights afforded under
the U.S. statutes vary substantially on these points.
cerning the individual's good faith exercise of rights under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and good faith exercise of rights under any state law upon which an
exemption has been granted by the Board. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(2)(z).
149 Directive, supra note 15, art. 8(1).
150 See id. art. 8 (2). The Directive indicates that under some circumstances,
the Member State may provide that consent of the data subject cannot be given.
151 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The U.S. Supreme Court itself is divided on the
issue of what type of association is protected and under what circumstances the
protection of the Constitution is to be afforded. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (allowing the release of the names of minorities contributing to minority
parties). But see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down a re-
quirement that the NAACP disclose its membership rosters).
152 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). But see, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
153 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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1. Notice of the File's Existence
Article 10 and Article 11 both require the controller to no-
tify the data subject when data concerning him is collected.154
Whether the information is collected from the subject himself or
from another party, the collector must, at minimum, inform the
data subject of the identity of the controller and the purposes
for which the data is intended.155 This provision also requires
that, as regards the circumstances of the processing, the subject
should be guaranteed fair processing.156
In contrast, pursuant to the PA, the government agency is
not required to supply a specific individual with notice of the
existence of a data file concerning him.1 57 Instead, the PA re-
quires the agency to publish a notice in the Federal Register
that lists the character of the record system and the category of
individuals covered by the record system.'15 Despite the seem-
ingly low standard of notice, the record of compliance by the
agencies has been low.1 59 The Directive seems to be based upon
direct notice to the specific data subject, therefore, the PA would
have to be modified to meet the adequacy requirements of the
E.U.
154 Article 10 details the information to be transmitted to the data subject
when the information is collected from the data subject. See Directive supra note
15, art. 10. Article 11 lists the information to be given to the data subject if the
information is collected from a source other than the subject. See Directive supra
note 15, art. 11.
155 Other information provided to the data subject includes; the recipients of
the data, whether replies to the inquiries are obligatory or voluntary, as well as,
the possible consequences of failure to reply, the existence of the right of access to
and the right to rectify the data concerning him. See id.
156 See id. arts. 10, 11.
157 The general consensus of Congress was that since the information held by
government was most likely collected directly from the individual by the agency in
question, the individual was already aware of many of the files concerning them.
See GREENAWALT, supra note 58 at 53.
158 Privacy Act (PA) of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) (1994). This constitutes gen-
eral notice to the public. Ostensibly, this provision would allow an individual sus-
pecting he was included within the category of individuals covered by the records
to object to the disclosure of data concerning him.
159 The General Accounting Office(GAO) investigated federal compliance with
the public notice requirements and found that almost one-third of the agencies
were in violation of the PA. Big Brotherism Feared: GAO Report Raises New Com-
puter Privacy Concerns, Comm. DAILY, Aug. 31, 1990, at 6. In addition, the GAO
reported that 78% of the computer systems were interconnected. See id. This was
interpreted to mean that "data collected on individuals without their knowledge
and consent [w]as widely available" to both government and commercial users." Id.
1997]
27
PACE INT'L L. REV.
The CMPPA's position on the individual's right to know of a
file's existence is based on the presumptions of the PA. How-
ever, if an individual's benefits are in jeopardy by virtue of in-
formation discovered pursuant to a match, the CMPPA requires
the agency to notify the individual of the findings of the match
and advise him of what procedures he should follow to challenge
the match's results. 160 The CMPPA also prohibits taking ad-
verse action until the agency verifies the accuracy of the ad-
verse information. 161 As a corollary, if the match does not
result in adverse action to the individual, a newly compiled
(matched) file would exist concerning the individual and no no-
tice of its existence would be required. One might argue that
the most important notice an individual would want is the
existence of adverse information in his file. If that is the case,
then a failure to inform the individual of a newly compiled but
"positive" data file might not be considered a serious deficiency.
It is substantially different from the provisions of the Directive
and might not be considered affording "adequate protection."
The individual's right to discover the existence of a file
under the FCRA is limited. If the report is a consumer report,
there is no requirement of "automatic" notice. 162 The only noti-
fication requirement attaches when the individual has been de-
nied a benefit by the user of a report. 163 If the report is an
investigative consumer report, however, the individual is pro-
vided a much more complete right of notification. When an in-
vestigative report is requested, the user must inform the
consumer of the request and of the consumer's right to request
disclosure of the nature and scope of the investigation. 164 With
this notice, the consumer has the right to request information
concerning the purpose, nature and scope of the investigation,
the sources of information, and the identity of any of the re-
port's recipients. 165 This coverage is fairly complete. Its draw-
back is that these requirements are triggered only when the
160 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(3)(1)(B).
161 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(1)(A).
162 The individual has a right to see his file on demand. This is not the same as
having a right of notification concerning the existence of a file.
163 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1994).
164 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(1).
165 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(b).
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individual's initial eligibility is being considered. 166 If the
FCRA were to be amended to provide pre-disclosure notice pro-
visions for both investigative reports and regular consumer re-
ports, it would most likely meet the adequacy requirements of
the Directive.
FERPA seems to assume that the student is aware of the
file's existence and makes no provision for notice. Its protec-
tions focus on access to and limitations on secondary disclosure.
Since these protections are reasonably well defined, FERPA's
silence on notice provisions should not be fatal to its adequacy
under the Directive.
2. Right of Access to the File
Article 12 gives the data subject the right to obtain per-
sonal information held by others. Included in this right of ac-
cess is the right to correct information that is found to be
incorrect. Article 13 allows for the creation of exemptions from
this right of access.
Under the PA, the individual has a right to access his file if
he believes he is included within the character of the record and
category of individuals in a system of records. The individual
must make an inquiry of the agency; the agency is not required
to notify the individual of the record. 167 This assumes that the
individual would have a reason to think he was included within
a category of records about to be disclosed. Such awareness is
not likely on the part of either a U.S. citizen or E.U. national.
Another limitation on the right of access is that the file can only
be viewed at the agency's site.' 68 If the agency is located in
Washington, D.C., gaining access to the record would be bur-
densome work for the data subject. This deficiency may render
the access provisions of the PA inadequate. Pursuant to the
CMPPA, an individual can gain access to matched records only
after the match is performed. The agency, which performed the
match, informs the individual that due to the adverse informa-
166 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(b).
167 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f). The agency is only obligated to respond to an indi-
vidual's inquiry if it is satisfied that the inquiry is a legitimate one.
168 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d).
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tion discovered, the individual's federal benefits are at risk.169
The individual must be advised of the procedures to follow in
contesting the findings of the match. 170 The agency cannot pro-
ceed with the adverse action until it verifies the data indepen-
dently. 171 While some might prefer that the notice to the
individual be made before the match, the pre-action notification
is probably vital. It protects against the loss of benefits by pro-
viding the data subject with the opportunity to correct inaccu-
rate statements. While admittedly not perfect, this CMPPA
provision does insure the fairness and accuracy required by the
Directive. However, it does not presently meet the Directive's
notice requirements.
Access under the FCRA can occur upon the request of the
data subject, but free access occurs only when the user of a con-
sumer report denies a benefit.' 7 2 In the absence of such a de-
nial, the individual may be required to pay a fee if he wants to
access his credit report.'7 3 The report may be accessed either in
person or by telephone pursuant to written request. 74 The ac-
cess provisions of the FCRA would seem to meet the adequacy
requirements of the Directive.
Each institution subject to FERPA is required to establish
procedures for granting access to the student's records. 75 Ac-
cess must be provided in no more than 45 days after the request
has been made. The access has few limitations. 7 6 There
should be no problem with FERPA meeting the Directive's ade-
quacy standards concerning access.
3. Restrictions on Collection of the Information
Under the Directive, if the data is processed pursuant to
7(e) or 7(f), the data subject has the right ". . . to object at any
169 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(1)(B). The individual is also notified of what proce-
dures he should follow to contest the accuracy of the data. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(p)(1).
170 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(3).
171 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(1)(A)(i).
172 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C § 1681m (1994).
173 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g-h.
174 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g-h.
175 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).
176 Exclusions include the financial records of parents, and pre Jan. 1, 1975
letters of recommendation. See id. at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(a)(1)(B). The student
can waive his access rights to recommendation letters.
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time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular
situation to the processing of data relating to him."177 When
there is a "justified objection," the controller is required to
"cease the processing." 178 Conversely, under the PA, the agency
cannot collect the information unless the data is relevant to the
agency's use' 7 9 and it must inform the individual whether col-
lection of the data is mandatory or voluntary. This acts as a
virtual non-restriction since there is no central agency which
monitors the agency's compliance with the PA. No provision al-
lows the data subject to challenge the agency's right to collect
the data. The agency's duties to the data subject are evident
only by virtue of the penalties imposed for "willful acts"8 0 and
actual damages for any "adverse effect"' 8 ' suffered by the data
subject.
Before a match can be performed under the CMPPA, a for-
mal agreement must exist between the agency and the request-
ing party.18 2 The matching process is limited to an 18-month
period.'8 3 Unlike the PA procedure, the party requesting a
match under the CMPPA must specify the source of its author-
ity to collect the information, the purpose of the match, describe
the records that will be searched, and the methods to be used in
verifying the accuracy of the information used in the match. 8 4
Under the FCRA, the CRA may only collect information re-
lating to determinations of credit worthiness or reputation of a
consumer. 8 5 In the absence of an agreement between an indi-
vidual and his creditor, the creditor is free to record the infor-
mation with the CRA. The FCRA requires that adverse
information in a report cannot be recorded in a subsequent re-
177 See id. art 14. In the 1992 Commission Draft, the data subject had a right
to object pursuant to every provision of article 7. Supra note 13 art. 15.
178 See id.
179 Relevance means that the information is "necessary to accomplish a pur-
pose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order... "
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). As an additional protection to the individual, the PA requires
that the agency maintain its records with "such accuracy, relevance, timeliness,
and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness. . . " in decisions
made about the individual. 52 U.S.C. § (e)(5).
180 5 U.S.C. § 552A(G)(4).
181 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
182 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(A)-(D).
183 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(2).
184 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(A)-(D).
185 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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port unless it is verified.'8 6 The FCRA is based on the presump-
tion that CRA' require no pre-collection consent in accepting
consumer information from the data subject's creditors. While
consent under Article 7(a) is the preliminary basis for legitimiz-
ing data processing, the Directive implies that records can be
collected without consent for specified purposes.'8 7
The presumption made in FERPA is that data was volunta-
rily surrendered by the student during the application process
and matriculation at the educational institution. Consequently,
there is no need to provide restrictions to collection. Due to the
other protections provided, the absence of any limitation on the
right to collect information does not destroy FERPA's adequacy
under the Directive.
4. Restrictions on Secondary Use'88
Article 14(b) of the Directive provides that the opportunity
to object to disclosure must have been offered to the data subject
before personal data is either disclosed to third parties or the
data is used for direct marketing purposes. The PA, on the
other hand, requires that information not be used for any pur-
pose other than that for which it was collected.' 8 9 It also pro-
vides twelve exemptions to confidentiality, 190 that mirror the
principles relating to "the reasons for making data processing
legitimate" under Article 7.191 PA exemptions 1, 4, 7, 9, 10 and
11 could be categorized as falling under the Directive article
7(e) type; PA exemptions 5 and 6 could fall under Directive Arti-
186 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
187 Directive, art. 7(b)-(f).
188 Secondary use refers to the use of the information for a purpose other than
that for which the data was collected from the data subject.
189 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(1).
190 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(1)-(12). The data is exempt from confidentiality if
the proposed disclosure is 1) to officers and employees of the agency needing the
records for the performance of their duties; 2) required under the FOIA; 3) for rou-
tine uses under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7); 4) to the Census Bureau; 5) for bona fide
statistical research using non-identifiable information; 6) to National Archives and
Record Administration for a record having historical value; 7) to an instrumental-
ity of government for civil or criminal law enforcement activity; 8) for health,
safety or preservation of the individual; 9) to either House of Congress or commit-
tee to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction; 10) to the comptroller general in
the course of the performance of his duties; 11) pursuant to a court order; or 12) to
a consumer reporting agency pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3711.
191 Directive, art. 7(a)-(f). See discussion on these provisions supra part III. A.
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cle 7(f); and PA exemption 8 could be described as a Directive
Article 7(d)-type reason.192 Even if the PA exemptions did not
satisfy the adequacy requirements of the Directive, the data
transfer could most likely occur under the derogations of Article
26.193
Two exemptions are problematic for the PA passing Direc-
tive muster. PA exemption (2) allowing for disclosure of data if
disclosure is required by FOIA has already been discussed.
194
The other significant limitation of the PA, however, is its ex-
emption (3) allowing for disclosure "for routine uses.' 95 Rou-
tine use is defined in the PA to mean "use of such record for a
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected."196 In theory, the routine use exemption restricted
the scope of disclosure and "adequately" protected the privacy of
the individual. In practice, however, the agencies used this ex-
emption as a broad grant of disclosure. 197
This exemption was used to justify a staggering number of
data matching activities. 198 This practice combined with two
other factors to render the PA's protections illusory.199 Unlike
the Directive, the PA did not require the agency to restrict the
use of the information upon its transfer to a third party.200 In
192 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
193 Directive, art. 26(1). The derogations are substantially similar to the provi-
sions allowing processing under article 7. See Directive supra note 15, art. 7.
194 See discussion supra part III. A.
195 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
196 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7).
197 This abuse of the exemption was criticized by both the government and by
the courts. See, e.g., PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, THE PRIVACY ACT OF
1974: AN ASSESSMENT 91-93 (1977); HOUSE COMM'N ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY, OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, by the Office
of Budget and Management and by Congress, H.R. Doc. No, 98-455, 98' Cong. 1"t
Sess. 41-53(1983); Britt v. Naval Investigative Services, 866 F.2d. 544 (3d Cir.
1989); Swenson v. United States Postal Services, 890 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.
1989); Edison v. Dept. of the Army, 672 F.2d 840, 846 (11th Cir. 1982).
198 A survey of a limited number of authorized data matching programs re-
ported that matches involving approximately seven billion records were performed
in a five year period. SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T. AFFAIRS, THE COMPUTER MATCHING
AND PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1987, S. Rep. No. 516, 1 0 0 h Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1988). Congress attempted to plug this hole by the enactment of the CMPPA. See
discussion infra part III.
199 See DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY in SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 323
(1989).
200 Directive, art. 6. "1. Member States shall provide that personal data must
be: (a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit, and legiti-
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addition, there was no requirement that a requesting party es-
tablish a legitimate need for the information before it was
turned over. 201 The "routine use" exemption needed to be sub-
stantially tightened if the PA was to meet the adequacy stan-
dard of the Directive on secondary disclosure. 202
In the attempt to eliminate the "data matching" loophole
created by the "routine use" exemption, Congress enacted the
CMPPA.20 3 Its specific purpose was to restrict the govern-
ment's ability to collect data concerning individuals by "match-
ing" data held by one agency with data held by a different
agency or other source. 20 4 The broad information collection op-
portunity of data matching had effectively circumvented the
PA's consent requirement.
The CMPPA imposed a series of pre-matching require-
ments to answer the apparent deficiencies. As a prerequisite to
performing a match, a requesting agency had to enter into a
written agreement with the source. The agreement had to spec-
ify the legal authority for the match, the purpose and justifica-
tion for the match, describe the records that would be searched,
mate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those pur-
poses. Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes
shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States provide ade-
quate safeguards . . . [i]t shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is
complied with." Id.
201 See discussion infra part IIL D. 4.
202 Congress did attempt to address the deficiencies of this exemption in a 1991
proposed Bill, which would have amended the PA in two respects: Define routine
use to mean a purpose "which is necessary for the purpose for which the record is
collected." See Privacy Act Amendments of 1991, H.R. Res. 2443, 102nd Cong.
(1991). The other proposed amendment would have prohibited the use of the Fed-
eral Register as a means of noticing "routine use." See 137 CONG. REC. H3451
(daily ed. May 22, 1991) (This measure did not pass.).
203 Until its enactment, the matching of data was considered by many agencies
a "routine use." See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYS-
TEM AND INDMDUAL PRIVACY 57 (1986).
204 "[Tlhe term 'matching program'- (A) means any computerized comparison
of- (i) two or more automated systems of records or a system of records with non-
Federal records for the purpose of- (I) establishing or verifying the eligibility of,
or continuing compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements by, appli-
cants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services
with respect to, cash or in-kind assistance or payments under Federal benefit pro-
grams, or (II) recouping payments or delinquent debts under such Federal benefit
programs . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8). See generally Comment, The Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988: Necessary Relief From the Erosion of
the Privacy Act of 1974, 2 SOFTWARE L.J.391 (1988).
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and specify the procedures for verifying the accuracy of the in-
formation used in the match.20 5 The agency was also required
to give notice to the public that a match was going to be done or
revised.206
Unlike the Directive's Article 14, the CMPPA did not give
the individual the power to prevent or object to a proposed
match.20 7 The propriety of the match was to be determined and
monitored internally by the agency's Data Integrity Board.208
As an ultimate oversight function, the Board reports the
agency's matching activities to the Office of Budget and Man-
agement once each year.209
The CMPPA did, however, create post-match protections
for the individual by requiring the agency to do an independent
check of information before taking adverse action. 210 The
agency was also required to issue "notice ... containing a state-
ment of its findings and informing the individual of the opportu-
nity to contest such findings."211 The standard of adequacy
should not be construed to require identical protections in a
third country. Assuming that the abuse of the "routine use" ex-
emption can be curtailed, pre-match notice to the individual
may not be crucial to the protection of the individual's informa-
tional privacy. Of more importance would be notice to the indi-
vidual that adverse information exists and his ability to correct
the inaccuracy before it can be used to his detriment. There-
fore, the post-match notice and access provisions of the CMPPA
should be considered as meeting the requirement of "adequacy."
The FCRA is based upon the secondary use of personal in-
formation. Reports are generated from information collected
pursuant to activities between the individual and creditors or
government. It would be rare if the data subject had direct in-
205 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(A)-(D)(1996).
206 See id. The notice is not given to a specific individual, but rather is a gen-
eral notice printed in the Federal Register no less than 30 days before the match is
conducted.
207 The Data Integrity Board was to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to deter-
mine and document "the justification of the program and any anticipated results
including a specific estimate of any savings" made because of the performance of
the match. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(B)(1996). Directive, art 14(a)(b).
208 5 U.S.C. § 552a(u)(3)(A)(C)(1994).
209 5 U.S.C. § 552a(u)(3)(D)(1994).
210 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(E), (p)(1)(A)(I)(1996).
211 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(3)(A)(1996).
1997]
35
PACE INT'L L. REV.
volvement with the consumer reporting agency. The FCRA
does require that use of consumer reports and investigative con-
sumer reports are limited to "legitimate business need."212 Un-
fortunately, the term "legitimate business need" is not defined
in the statute and there are few checks on the legitimacy of a
request. Another failing of FCRA is the post-adverse effect no-
tice provided by the statute.213
Under FERPA, express written consent is required before
disclosure can be made to a third party.214 The consent must
specify the records to be released and the purpose for the disclo-
sure.21 5 Disclosure, without consent, may be made pursuant to
a subpoena, but, not without notice to the student in advance of
compliance. 21 6 There are other permissible disclosures pursu-
ant to authority vested in the collector. 21 7 The consent provi-
sions of FERPA most resemble the consent requirement of the
Directive. FERPA's allowance of disclosure without consent
mirrors the permissible sans-consent provisions of the Direc-
tive. This satisfies the adequacy standard of the Directive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The panoply of U.S. data protection laws is still developing.
Despite the variances in protections afforded by the different
provisions considered, many will be said to meet the adequacy
requirements in some circumstances. As long as the U.S. re-
fuses to consider an omnibus approach to data protection, each
statute will have to be amended separately. There may not be a
serious blockage in transborder data flows between the U.S. and
E.U. nations, however, because of the broad ability for the par-
ties to contract between themselves as to parameters of the
data exchange. Despite this, it is clear that the E.U.'s vision of
data processing protections for individuals is far more devel-
oped than that of the U.S. Recently, the office of the National
Information Infrastructure filed a notice and request for com-
ments on draft principles which were to update the Code of Fair
212 See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1994).
213 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1984).
214 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(5)(A)(B) (1994).
215 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
216 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
217 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(3)(B).
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Information Practices developed in the 1970's.218 This notice
demonstrates a federal awareness that the U.S. may be lagging
behind in the full use of the information economy's resource.
We can be hopeful that the issues raised by that inquiry will
result in substantive changes in federal law.
218 National Information Infrastructure; Draft Principles for Providing and
Using Personal Information and Commentary, 60 Fed. Reg. 4362 (Office of Man-
agement and Budget 1995)(notice).
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